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FORFEITURE OF A PUBLIC SCHOOL: A NEED TO
CONTROL THE DEFEASIBLE FEE
Most states' allow a landowner to deed a plot of land to a school dis-
trict subject to the condition that the district use the property for a public
school purpose. Under such a deed, the land reverts back to the grantor
or his heirs if the conditioned use ceases.2 Changing conditions often
force school districts to close schools built on land acquired in this fash-
ion. When this occurs the district must either reopen the school, incur-
ring considerable expense, or risk the forfeiture of a publicly financed
building.3 Declining enrollments and dwindling public resources have
forced school systems to choose between these alternatives. Moreover,
demographic and fiscal trends suggest that this problem will recur.4
This Note explores judicial and legislative efforts to control the effects
of defeasible fees5 when the condition is placed upon school property.
I. A minority of states have enacted laws to limit or abolish the fee simple determinable and
the fee upon a condition subsequent. See infra note 109.
2. Conditional grants of land are called "defeasible fees." There are two basic types of defeasi-
ble fees: determinable fees, see infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text, and fees subject to condi-
tion subsequent , see infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
DeHart v. Ritenour Consol. School Dist. 663 S.W.2d 332 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) provides a typical
example. In DeHart the deed conveyed land subject to the following conditions:
1. That the Property shall be used for Public School Building ....
2. That the school shall be called the "LEWIS DEHART SCHOOL."
3. That if the property is not used for. . . school purposes, or if at any future time the
name should be changed, then said property shall revert to the above grantor herein or her
heirs.
Id. at 333. The school closed in 1982 due to declining enrollment, and the grantor's heirs sued to
compel forfeiture. The court construed the deed as creating a fee upon condition subsequent. Id. at
334. The court held, however, that the district's practice of storing school supplies in the school
constituted a "school purpose." The school district thus retained its fee subject to the conditions
imposed. Id. at 335.
3. The school district in DeHart must either reopen an unnecessary and financially burden-
some facility or continue to use the school as a warehouse. It can never sell the property to recap-
ture its investment without breaching the condition, thereby forfeiting the land. Id. at 334-35
(rejecting district's claim that it possessed a fee simple absolute due to its "substantial compliance").
4. Current enrollment projections indicate overall enrollment in public schools will continue
to decline into the mid-1980's, with high school attendance dropping well into the 1990's. The
number of high school graduates will decrease twenty-six percent from 1979 to 1991. AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS, DECLINING ENROLLMENT-CLOSING SCHOOLS:
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 12-15 (1981).
5. The courts enforce these future interests to permit a property owner to condition the future
use of his property when he transfers it. Simes, Elimination of Stale Restrictions on the Use of Land,
1954 A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP. PROB. AND TR. L. PROC. 4, 5. Grantors usually create future inter-
ests to benefit adjacent landowners, to retain a "gambler's chance" of recovering the property, or to
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Part I discusses defeasible fees from an analytical and historical perspec-
tive.6 Parts IIA and IIB examine the traditional legal devices courts used
to prevent forfeitures, 7 part IIC considers the equitable principles the ju-
diciary could adopt to deal with the problem,8 and part IID reviews ex-
isting and proposed statutory solutions.9 Finally, part III proposes a
legislative solution to relieve school districts of these burdensome
perpetuities. 0
I. ANALYTICAL AND HISTORICAL PRECEPTS
The determinable fee and the fee upon a condition subsequent repre-
sent two types of restrictions grantors can attach to their land." The
determinable fee ends immediately upon breach of the limitation.' 2 The
benefit from the restriction as part of the consideration for the conveyance. Williams, Restrictions on
the Use of Land: Conditions Subsequent and Determinable Fees, 27 TEx. L. REv. 158, 167 (1948);
see generally Brake, Fees Simple Defeasible The Purposes They Serve with an Appraisal of Their
Utility, 28 Ky. L.J. 424 (1940).
6. See infra notes 11-41 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 42-60 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 61-92 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 108-41 and accompanying text.
11. For the purposes of this Note, "defeasible fees" refers to only the fee on condition subse-
quent and the determinable fee. See supra note 2.
12. The determinable fee operates as follows: The grantor's conveyance contains a possibility
of reverter conditioned upon a specified event. If the stated event occurs, the ownership of the land
reverts back to the grantor or his successors in interest, who need not take any affirmative action to
reassert title. Oldfield v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 26 N.J. 246, 254-55, 139 A.2d 291, 298 (1958); RE-
STATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 44 (1936); 2 R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 1187 (1968).
Generally, words expressing a period of time such as "while," "during," or "so long as" creates a
determinable fee. Hagaman v. Board of Educ., 117 N.J. Super. 446, 451, 285 A.2d 63, 65 (1971);
Oldfield v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 26 N.J. 246, 256, 139 A.2d 291, 296 (1958); RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 44 comment 1 (1936); 2 R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 1187 (1968).
Express words of reversion are not necessary. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 44 comment a
(1936); L. SIMES, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 29 (1966); L. SIMES & A.
SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 286 (2d ed. 1956); Browder, Defeasible Fee Estates in
Oklahoma, 4 OKLA. L. REv. 141, 142 (1951).
Despite this general rule, the judicial dislike for forfeiture has caused some courts to deny the
existence of a condition of defeasance on the ground that the conveyance contained no reverter
clause. Board of Trustees of Ruston Cir. of Methodist Episcopal Church, South v. Rudy, 192 La.
200, 205-06, 187 So. 549, 551 (1939) (express reversionary provision necessary to create "restrictive
title"); In re Copps Chapel Methodist Episcopal Church, 120 Ohio St. 309, 312, 166 N.E. 218, 219
(1929) (reversionary clause necessary to create a determinable fee). Thus, although words of reverter
are technically unnecessary, because the grantor conveyed less than he had, a careful draftsman
should include such language. See W. LEACH & J. LOGAN, CASES AND TEXT ON FUTURE INTER-
ESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING 29 (1961); see generally Agnor, Creation of Defeasible Fees, 15 GA.
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grantor's possibility of reverter t3 automatically ripens into a fee simple
absolute. 4 In contrast, a breach of the condition terminates a fee upon a
condition subsequent 5 only if the holder of the right of entry asserts his
interest. 16
Courts traditionally have disfavored these conditional estates. 17 Con-
B.J. 20, 27-29 (1952); Note, Property-Fee Simple Determinables-Distinguishing Characteristics, 71
W. VA. L. REv. 367 (1969).
13. A possibility of reverter is the future interest remaining in the grantor after he, as owner of
land in fee simple absolute, conveys a determinable fee. L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 12, § 281.
Reversionary rights can only exist in the grantor or his heirs. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 96 (1962). In most states, the possibility of reverter can pass by both
descent and devise and is otherwise freely transferable. Id. at 102. But see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30
§ 37b (1983) (making the possibility of reverter nondevisable). It is not subject to the Rule Against
Perpetuities. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
14. C. MONYNIHAN, supra note 13, at 96; L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 12, § 283.
15. A fee of a condition subsequent gives the grantor, or whoever holds the right of reentry (or
"power of termination" in the Restatement terminology) the right to enter and reclaim the estate
when the event tolling the condition occurs. Hagaman v. Board of Educ., 117 N.J. Super. 446, 452,
285 A.2d 63, 66 (1971); Oldfield v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 26 N.J. 246, 254-55, 139 A.2d 291, 296
(1958); Bethlehem Township v. Emrick, 77 Pa. Commw. 327, 331-33, 465 A.2d 1085, 1088 (1983);
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 45 (1936); 2 R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY q 188
(1968).
Grantors generally use words such as "provided that," or "on the condition that" to create a fee
on a condition subsequent. DeHart v. Ritenour Consol. School Dist., 663 S.W.2d 332, 333 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 45 comment 1 (1936); L. SIMES, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 31-32 (1966). Such language, however, is usually not in itself sufficient
to create a condition subsequent. The grantor must also expressly reverse the right to reenter and
terminate the estate. Hagaman v. Board of Educ., 117 N.J. Super. 446, 452, 285 A.2d 63, 66 (1971);
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 45 comment j (1936); 2 R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY
188 (1968). Courts may imply a power of termination from words of forfeiture. See DeHart v.
Ritenour Consol. School Dist., 66 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
When a conveyance diverges from the standard language of a determinable fee or fee upon a
condition subsequent, determination of the estate intended becomes nearly impossible. Even where
the grantor employs the proper words, the resultant estate is not certain. M. McDOUGAL & D.
HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND 285 (1948), quoted in Williams, supra note 5, at 161 n.9.
Commentators disagree over whether the differences between these two fees are substantial
enough to warrant recognition. For an argument that the courts should ignore slight doctrinal
differences, see McDougal, Future Interests Restated: Tradition Versus Clarification and Reform, 55
HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1088-96 (1942); see also Dunham, Possibility of Reverter and Power of Termi-
nation-Fraternal or Identical Twins?, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 215 (1953).
16. While the possibility of reverter ripens automatically upon breach of the condition, the
holder of the right of entry must act affirmatively to terminate the granted estate. RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 405 (1936); C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 13, at 98; L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 12,
at 330. Rights of entry are both descendible and devisable, C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 13, at 109, but
otherwise are inalienable. Id. at 107-08.
17. Savanna School Dist. v. McLeod, 137 Cal. App. 2d 491, 494, 290 P.2d 593, 595 (1955)
("conditions are not favored in the law because they tend to destroy estates") (quoting Gramer v.
City of Sacramento, 2 Cal. 2d 432, 437-38, 41 P.2d 543, 545 (1935)); Roberts v. Rhodes, 231 Kan.
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ditional estates limit the use of land into perpetuity by threat of forfei-
ture," impairing alienability19 and preventing efficient and economical
use of a valuable resource.2" In addition, the number of the holders of
the reversionary interest, usually grantor's heirs, increases with each gen-
eration, splintering the ownership of the reversionary interest so that
clearing title becomes difficult or impossible.21 Finally, the breach may
74, 77, 643 P.2d 116, 118 (1982) ("[florfeitures are not favored in the law"); Holbrook v. Board of
Educ., 300 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957) (". . . the law does not favor forfeitures. . . [and
therefore) a deed will not be construed to create a conditional estate unless the language clearly
evinces such an intent."); L. SIMEs & A. SMiTH, supra note 12, at 299-300.
18. Rights of reentry and possibilities of reverter are generally exempt from the common law
Rule Against Perpetuities in the United States. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
19. Though land under the limitation "for school purposes only" is only an indirect restraint on
alienation, the grantee can only sell the land to another school district without risking forfeiture. See
Comment, Stale Future Intirests: Can Texas Pass a Constitutional Reverter Act?, 9 ST. MARY's L.
REv. 525, 537 n.78 (1978). Thus, the threat of forfeiture would discourage anyone wishing to
purchase the land for prohibited uses, thereby depressing its market value. Goldstein, Rights of
Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land, 54 HARV. L. REv, 248, 251
(1940). In addition, banks will not accept a mortgage on such property because the threat of forfei-
ture impairs the mortgage's security. See Trustees of Schools v. Botdorf, 6 Ill. 2d 486, 492, 130
N.E.2d 111, 114-15 (1955). For a general discussion of the problems raised by conditional fees, see
Fitze, Problems Relating to Stale Reverters and Restrictions, 38 NEB. L. REv. 150 (1959).
20. See Chaffin, Reverters, Rights of Entry, and Executory Interests: Semantic Confusion and
the Tying Up of Land, 11 FORDHAM L. REV. 303, 303 (1962) (defeasible fees limit land to un-
economical use unless the grantee pays an outrageous sum to loosen the restriction); Rogers, Re-
moval of Future Interest Encumbrances-Sale of the Fee Simple Estate, 17 VAND. L. REV. 1437,
1438 (1964) (permitting the grantor to tie up land usually only injures the community); Comment,
Future Interests--Effect of Change of Conditions on Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter
Created to Control the Use of Land, 53 MICH. L. REv. 246, 246-47 (1954) (defeasible fees prevent the
most appropriate use of land as conditions change). But cf. L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
DEAD HAND 40-54 (1955) (productive use argument does not justify restrictions on the length of
contingent future interests).
When use is long-standing, the holder of the future interest may not even be aware of the condi-
tion. Yet the fear of forfeiture still threatens the holder of the fee and prevents the optimal use of the
land.
21. In Brown v. Independent Baptist Church of Woburn, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950),
a conveyance for church purposes terminated after ninety years. More than one hundred persons
held fractional shares of the reversion. The value of the fractional shares of the descendants ranged
from $774.20 to $6.45. Almost half of the sale proceeds went to pay for attorney fees and a
geneaologist. W. LEACH & J. LOGAN, supra note 12, at 46.
Leach and Logan describe an additional hypothetical case in which a corporation holds a possibil-
ity of reverter. After the corporation dissolves, the reverter ripens into a fee. In that situation, the
court must trace the descendants of each shareholder and give them a portion of the land or pro-
ceeds. Id. at 46 n.16 (citing Addy v. Short, 47 Del. 157, 69 A.2d 136 (1952)). But Cf. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 30, § 37(d) (1983) (voids possibilities of reverter and rights of reentry when corporation
dissolves).
The splintering of the possibility of reverter or right of reentry diminishes the effect of any policy
arguments for forfeiture. The general public will lose a valuable asset while the grantor's heirs
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be unintentional or unavoidable. Nevertheless, the nature of the fee re-
quires courts to enforce the crude and severe remedy of forfeiture.22 De-
spite these objectionable features, courts usually enforce defeasible fees.23
The American law governing defeasible fees derives from the English
common law of estates.24 In England, placing conditions on the use of
land became an accepted practice by the late thirteenth century.25 Wide-
spread use of conditional estates created a tension between the societal
need for marketable land and the individual's desire to control the dispo-
sition of his property.26 Judicial attempts to balance these interests led to
the Law of Property Act of 1925,27 which effectively abolished all condi-
receive nearly worthless fractional shares. In addition, the land remains unmarketable unless every
one of the tens or hundreds of the grantor's heirs combine to convey the full fee.
22. "[A reversion's] all or nothing character has an inherent potential for working inequity,
since it provides no occasion for comparison of the severity of the remedy with the gravity of the
breach." Springmeyer v. City of South Lake Tahoe, 132 Cal. App. 3d 375, 380, 183 Cal. Rptr. 43,
46 (1982); see also Walsh, Conditional Estates and Covenants Running with the Land, 14 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 162, 173-77 (1937).
23. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (discussing judicial reluctance to deny the
legal effect of a defeasible fee).
24. Notwithstanding the theory of future interests, the common law of estates and its concept
of fragmented ownership forms the foundation for such basic and useful devices as the trust and the
power of appointment. Browder, Future Interest Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1255, 1255-57 (1960).
For a complete history of the development of the common law of estates, see F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1898) and Bordwell, English Property Reform
and its American Aspects, 37 YALE L.J. 1 (1927).
25. II F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 24, at 23.
26. An overview of English property law shows that the "distinguishing freature of the evolu-
tion of property law has been the desire to make land more freely alienable and less fettered with
restrictions." Comment, supra note 19, at 537. In 1285, the Statute De Donis Conditionalibus, 13
Edw. I. c.1, sanctioned the creation of a perpetual fee tail. The common recovery fiction of Tal-
trum's Lease, Y.B. 12 Edw. IV, c. 19, in 1797, established a means of barring the tenant in tail and
the reversioner or remainderman. The Statute of Uses, 27 Henry VII, c.10, appeared less than one
hundred years after Taltrum's Lease. As construed in Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep.
504 (1920), it provided a method of creating an indestructible executory device. Rogers, supra note
20, at 1438-39.
The modern Rule Against Perpetuities (the Rule) limited the enforceability of future interests to
those that "must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation
of the interest." J. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (4th ed. 1942). In England,
the Rule limited rights of entry and possibilities of reverter in the common law, see, eg., In re
Trustees of Hollis' Hosp. and Hogues' Contract, 2 Ch. 540 (1899) (right of entry); Hooper v. Corpo-
ration of Liverpool, 88 Sol. J. 213 (Lancaster Palatine Court 1944) (possibility of reverter), and by
statute, see Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, ch. 55 (adopting the "wait and see" ap-
proach); see also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 370, 372 (1944); L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW
or FUTURE INTERESTS § 1236 (2d ed. 1956) (discussing the Rule's English application). American
courts failed to apply the Rule similarly to the same future interests. See infra note 30.
27. 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20.
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tional interests in land.28
America adopted the English view favoring free disposition of land.2 9
Unlike their English counterparts, however, American courts did not ap-
ply the Rule Against Perpetuities to limit rights of entry or possibilities
of reverter.3° Moreover, when American courts adopted the system of
estates developed under English law, they apparently refused to consider
statutes such as Quie Emptores,31 which limited those estates. Adoption
of such limiting doctrines might have led American courts to abolish the
28. The Law of Property Act limited the use of all estates inland, except the fee simple absolute
and the term of years absolute, to equitable interests under a trust. Id. § 4. The act effectively
eliminated rights of reentry and possibilities of reverter as legal interests inland. See Bordwell, supra
note 24. The Act preserves common law future interests in chattel, while eliminating the restraints
these interests impose on land. The trustee has the power to improve, lease, mortgage, and convey
the land in fee simple absolute, without fear of forfeiture or litigation. Fratcher, 4 Modest Proposal
for Trimming the Claws of Legal Future Interests, 1972 DuxE L.J. 517, 547-48; see generally
Bordwell, supra note 24; Crane, The Law of Real Property in England and the United States: Some
Comparisons, 36 IND. L.J. 282 (1961).
Not surprisingly, commentators have suggested similar statutes for application in the United
States. See Waggoner, Reformulating the Structure of Estates: A Proposal for Legislative Actions, 85
HARV. L. REv. 729 (1972).
29. Browder, supra note 24, at 1257. The American attitude towards property, especially land,
contained "a very deeply engrained. . . desire that every owner of land should be free to use and
distribute it as he pleases." Rogers, supra note 20, at 1437; see also Bostick, Loosening the Grip of the
Dead Hand: Shall we Abolish Legal Future Interests in Land?, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1061, 1100-01
(1979). Any attempt to reform the use of future interests involves divesting donors of their accus-
tomed freedom, a formidable task. See generally Fellman, The European Background of Early
American Ideas Concerning Property, 14 TEMP. L.Q. 497 (1940). For a biting criticism of attempts
to justify the exclusion of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry from application of the Rule, see
W. LEACH & J. LOGAN, supra note 12, at 40-42.
30. See, eg., School Bd. of Scott Co. v. Dowell, 190 Va. 676, 58 S.E.2d 38 (1950).
In refusing to apply the Rule, courts have usually reasoned that rights of reentry and possibilities
of reverter are existing property rights owned by living and theoretically ascertainable persons who
together with the holder of the fee, can convey a merchantable title. Fratcher, supra note 28, at 528;
Comment, supra note 20, at 247 n.3. But see supra note 21 and accompanying text (shares of rever-
sionary interest often become fractionalized).
Another commentator sets out three additional reasons cited by American courts. First, the law
in England at that time was so confused that there was no clear position for the American courts to
adopt. Second, many American courts considered the right of reentry and possibility of reverter as
vested and therefore not limited by the Rule. Third, these interests are not alienable and therefore
do not represent a great restraint on free disposition of land. Cook, Rights of Entry, Possibilities of
Reverter, Resulting Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 15 TEMP. L.Q. 509, 517-21 (1941).
Rejecting each of these reasons, the author concluded that the courts really exempted defeasible fees
from the Rule to encourage the charitable, donative transfer. Id. at 521-22.
31. 1290, 18 Edw. I, ch. 1. Quia Emptores effectively ended subinfeudation by allowing the
owner of an estate in fee simple absolute to convey all his interest by merely paying a small sum to
his overlord. 2 R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 177 (1966).
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determinable fee.32
Stewart v. Blain33 illustrates the formalistic approach taken by Ameri-
can courts. In Stewart, the grantor conveyed land "for the purpose of
erecting a schoolhouse. . . .," on condition that the land would revert
back to the grantor or his heirs if the county ever removed the school-
house. After twenty-five years, the county closed the school and sold the
land with the schoolhouse. A Texas court held that the deed conveyed a
determinable fee, which terminated when the county sold the school-
house.34 The court rejected other constructions of the deed as disingenu-
ous or hypertechnical interpretations that would thwart the clear
intention of the grantor.35 A modem court might have used several con-
structional devices to preserve the district's estate.36
32. Very few cases have held that Quia Emptores abolished determinable fees. See 1 H. TIF-
FANY, REAL PROPERTY § 93 (2d ed. 1920). For the competing views on this issue, compare J.
GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 712 (4th ed. 1942) (the determinable fee is a form of subinfeu-
dation and therefore is abolished by the statute) with Powell, "Determinable Fees," 23 COLUM. L.
REV. 207, 212-17 (1923) (the fee simple determinable survived the statute).
33. 159 S.W. 928 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
34. Id. at 929.
35. Id. at 930-31. Another early case exhibiting this strict approach is Gray v. Blanchard, 25
Mass. (8 Pick) 283 (1829). In Gray, the grantor conveyed land upon the condition that the grantees
not place windows in the north wall of a house for thirty years. Id. at 284. Eighteen years later,
when the grantees breached the condition, the court declared a forfeiture. The court considered the
grantees' claims that the condition was useless and that the forfeiture was a harsh remedy legally
irrelevant. Id. at 290. The court was obviously uneasy with the law it felt compelled to apply: "We
therefore see no ground on which, consistently with the rules of law, we can deny demandant's
claim. It is a harsh proceeding, on his part, but it is according to his contract, which must be
enforced if he insists upon it." Id. at 292.
36. See infra notes 45-57 & 79-92.
In Stewart, the court could have used several constructional devices to avoid a forfeiture. First,
the conveyance stated it was "for the purpose of erecting a schoolhouse." The court could have held
that, in the absence of words of special limitation, the statement does not create a condition on the
title of the land. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. Second, the court might have held
that the statement of consideration that preceeded the limiting language created only a covenant.
See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text. Third, because the reversion only became effective
upon "removal" of the schoolhouse, the court could have required actual physical removal of the
building from the land to breach the condition. See Wichita Falls Grain Co. v. Taylor Foundry Co.,
649 S.W.2d 798, 800-01 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (actual, permanent removal of structure required to
trigger right of reentry). Finally, the court could have read the reversionary language as merely
creating a fee upon condition subsequent. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. Under this
construction, the court could have denied forfeiture for failure to reenter within a reasonable time.
See infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text, or because the right of reentry died with the grantor,
see infra note 60 and accompanying text.
While the court in Stewart may have been technically correct in finding a defeasance, the wide-
spread use of such constructional devices indicates the social unacceptability of these forfeitures.
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Commentators37 criticized this deferential approach because it resulted
in many inequitable forfeitures.38 Courts soon responded with ingenious
and occasionally strained efforts to mitigate the undesirable results of
literal enforcement of the conditional deeds.39
Judicial aversion to forfeiture increases when the government makes
publicly financed improvements on the land conveyed.40 Recent in-
creases in the number of school closings due to declining enrollment and
fiscal crisis have intensified judicial and legislative efforts to avoid forfei-
ture in these circumstances. 1
II. EXISTING LEGAL RESPONSES
A. Judicial Construction: Finding No Condition of Defeasance
When construing deeds, courts generally disfavor constructions that
result in forfeiture.42 A court will not find that a deed creates a condi-
tional estate unless the grantor clearly expressed his intent to condition
the grant.43 In addition, a court will resolve all doubt in favor of the
grantee.' Thus, if a grantor conveys the land "for school purposes" or
"upon the condition that" that property sustain a school, a court proba-
bly will hold that the language merely expresses the grantor's motive,
37. See Chaffin, supra note 20, at 304, 307-14; Goldstein, supra note 19, at 254.
38. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 42-92 and accompanying text.
40. "The law raises every intendment in favor of a charity, against the grantor of those claiming
under him. Public schools intended for the children in the neighborhood are favorites in this State,
and must receive the protection and support, as far as is reasonable, of the public tribunals." McKis-
sick v. Pickle, 16 Pa. 140, 148 (1851).
41. See supra note 4.
42. Courts do not favor forfeitures at law or in equity. E.g., Humphrey v. J.C. Jung Educ.
Center, 714 F.2d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Charter Real Estate Co., 226 F. Supp.
285, 288 (D.R.I. 1964) (court will only find disfavored condition if express); Rose v. Directors of
School Dist., 162 Kan. 720, 726, 179 P.2d 181, 186 (1947) (the law does not favor a construction
resulting in a forfeiture); Bethlehem Township v. Emrick, 77 Pa. Commw. 327, 336, 465 A.2d 1085,
1090 (1983) (the law abhors forfeiture upon conditions subsequent; courts will strictly construe re-
strictions on the forfeiture).
43. Springmeyer v. City of South Lake Tahoe, 132 Cal. App. 3d 375, 380, 183 Cal. Rptr. 43, 46
(1983) (the precise event that triggers reversion must be plain in the deed, otherwise the court will
read the deed to preclude reversion); Martin v. Grutka, 151 Ind. App. 167, 173, 278 N.E.2d 586, 590
(1972) (clear showing of intent to convey less than the full fee needed to create conditional estate);
Holbrook v. Board of Educ., 300 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Ky. 1957) (court will not construe deed to create
a conditional estate unless the language clearly evinces such intent).
44. Springmeyer v. City of South Lake Tahoe, 132 Cal. App. 3d 275, 381, 183 Cal. Rptr. 43, 46
(1983) (if a reasonable construction avoids reversion, the court must adopt it). See Chaffin, supra
note 20, at 316.
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purpose, or "understanding." 4 Such a deed conveys the whole fee free
of any condition of defeasance.46
When the words of the deed raise doubts as to the grantor's intent,
courts may avoid forfeiture by interpreting the limiting language of the
deed as a covenant instead of a condition.47 Courts may refuse to enforce
covenants because of impossibility48 or because of a change in surround-
ing conditions.49 Landowners may sue in equity to remove covenants as
clouds upon their titles.5 ° Also, courts may void covenants if the restric-
tion no longer benefits the surrounding property. 51 Finally, even if a
court does enforce the covenant, the remedy for breach is at most dam-
45. See Roberts v. Rhodes, 231 Kan. 74, 77-78, 643 P.2d 116, 119-20 (1982) (citing cases);
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 44 comment m (1936); R. POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 1 188
(1968).
In Roberts the grantor deeded land to a school district "only for school or cemetery purposes."
The court held that the words merely stated an "understanding" of the purpose of the conveyance,
and did not limit the fee. 231 Kan. at 80, 643 P.2d at 120. The Roberts court also relied upon the
district's longstanding fulfillment of the "understanding." Basing its holding on the case's "facts and
circumstances," the court stated that a grant for school purposes that does not use language of
limitation, "conveys fee simple title when the land has been accepted and used by the grantee for
school purposes for more than sixty years." Id.
46. See Trone v. Nelson, 89 111. App. 3d 1000, 1004, 412 N.E.2d 172, 175 (1980); Roberts v.
Rhodes, 231 Kan. 74, 77, 643 P.2d 116, 119 (1982); Hughes v. Gladewater County Line Indep.
School Dist., 124 Tex. 190, 194, 76 S.W.2d 471, 475 (1934); 68 AM. JUR. 2D Schools § 64 (1973).
47. This may be the method courts use most commonly to avoid finding a defeasance.
Humphrey v. C.J. Jung Educ. Center, 714 F.2d 477, 482-83 (5th Cir. 1983) (courts will construe
anything less than a clear and specific condition subsequent as a restrictive covenant despite provi-
sions for a right of reentry); MacDonald Properties, Inc. v. Bel-Air Country Club, 72 Cal. App. 3d
693, 699, 140 Cal. Rptr. 367, 371 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (courts disfavor condition subsequents and
often construe them as covenants); Board of Educ. v. Edgerton, 244 N.C. 576, 578, 94 S.E.2d 661,
663-64 (1956) (if restrictive language is at all ambiguous, it creates only a covenant, not a condition);
Malloy v. Newman, 649 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (if a court can construe a restriction
as either a condition or a covenant, it prefers the covenant construction). See R. POWELL, POWELL
ON REAL PROPERTY 188 n.16 (1968); Note, Terminating Conditions Unlimited in Time, 27 IND.
L.J. 245, 247 n.5 (1952). But see Murray v. Trustees of Lane Seminary, 1 Ohio Op. 2d 236, 240, 140
N.E.2d 577, 582 (1956) (court found a fee upon a condition subsequent despite use of the word
"covenant").
48. Comment, supra note 20, at 247 n.5.
49. Humphrey v. C.J. Jung Educ. Center, 714 F.2d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1983) (changed circum-
stances will not void a right of reentry, but may invalidate a restrictive covenant); Blakely v. Gorin,
365 Mass. 590, 604, 313 N.E.2d 903, 912 (1974) (restrictive covenant unenforceable because change
in conditions made it obsolete). But see Loeb v. Watkins, 428 Pa. 480, 484, 240 A.2d 513, 516 (1968)
(court uheld and enforced restrictive covenant; dissent argues covenant had become "absurd, futile,
and ineffective"); see generally Simes, Elimination of Stale Restrictions on the Use of Land, 1954
A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP. PROB. AND TR. L. PROC. 4, 6 (discussing doctrine of changed
circumstances).
50. McArthur v. Hood Rubber Co., 221 Mass. 372, 376, 109 N.E. 162, 164 (1915).
51. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537(a) (1940).
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ages, rather than a mandatory forfeiture.52
In Savanna School District of Orange County v. McLeod,53 for example,
the grantors deeded land to a school district for public school purposes
only, with ownership to revert to the grantors if the land was used for
other purposes.54 When the school district abandoned the building forty-
five years later, the grantors' heirs sued, arguing that the land had re-
verted back to them. The court denied their requested relief on several
grounds.55 The court's principal rationale was that the words of limita-
tion in the deed expressed a mere promise or a covenant because a state-
ment of consideration immediately preceded the conditional language.5 6
The court then determined that the school district had fulfilled the cove-
nant and thus that the plaintiffs had lost any claim under the deed.5
The Savanna court's holding is not supported by the language of the
deed. The grantor's use of express words of reversion strongly suggests
that he intended to create a defeasible fee.58 The court, however, im-
posed another interpretation to justify a result that appears in fact to rest
on considerations of fairness and public policy.59 Savanna illustrates
52. In Dilbeck v. Bill Gaynier, Inc., 368 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), the court stated
that the principal difference between a covenant and a condition was that a covenant's remedy is an
action for damages, while the condition's remedy is forfeiture of the estate. Id. at 807.
Courts have also construed conditional language as creating only an easement, Fleck v. Universal.
Cyclops Steel Corp., 397 Pa. 648, 651, 156 A.2d 832, 834 (1959), or a trust, United States v. Certain
Land in the City of Cape Girardeau, 79 F. Supp. 558, 561 (E.D. Mo. 1948), affidsub nom., Carmack
v. United States, 177 F.2d 463, 466-67 (8th Cir. 1949). Courts rarely use these constructions, how-
ever, when interpreting grants conditional on school uses.
53. 137 Cal. App. 2d 491, 290 P.2d 593 (1955).
54. The granting clause in the deed read:
Said land is hereby conveyed. . . for public school purposes only, and it is expressly un-
derstood and agreed that as a consideration for this conveyance said party of the second
part shall build and maintain a public school building on said land, and that the title and
ownership of said land shall revert. . . upon a failure. . . to erect and maintain a building
thereon to be used exclusively for public school purposes.
Id. at 492, 290 P.2d at 594 (emphasis added).
55. The court held that the right of reentry was personal to the grantor because the reverter
clause contained no words of inheritance. Id. at 496, 290 P.2d at 596. In addition, it held that the
term "maintain" did not require the district to preserve the schoolhouse forever, but only that it use
the property for school purposes. Id. at 495, 290 P.2d at 596.
56. Id. at 496, 290 P.2d at 596.
57. Id.
58. See supra note 54 (language of deed); notes 11-16 and accompanying text (discussing defea-
sible fees).
59. "Such results must rest either upon a judicial conviction that conveyancers use language of
condition without an awareness of its reasonable meaning, or upon a belief that the social policy
hostile to forfeitures requires frustration of the conveyor's manifested intent." R. POWELL, POWELL
ON REAL PROPERTY 1188 (1968). The grantor's express use of a clear reversionary clause negates
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how far a court may go to deny the grantor's intent and provide relief to
the grantee in the face of apparent language of defeasance.
Finally, if the reversion does not mention the grantor's heirs, the court
may hold that the death of the original grantor extinguished the restric-
tion. For example, reversion to "the party of the first part" or "the
grantors herein" will usually lead a court to find that the condition has
expired. 6°
B. Judicial Construction: Finding No Breach of Condition
A conveyance that contains words of specific condition or limitation
and provides for a reversion or right of entry usually creates a defeasible
fee.6 1 Courts, however, may still deny forfeiture if they find that the
grantee's action did not breach the condition.62
For example, a technical and inadvertent violation may not constitute
a breach of the condition.63 In Mills v. Evansville Seminary, the gran-
tor conveyed land on the condition that the grantees use it for a semi-
nary, expressly providing for reversion when that use terminated.65 The
trustees of the seminary later closed and sold the seminary. When the
grantor threatened to reenter the purchaser quickly reconveyed the land
to the trustees, who restored the seminary. The court denied forfeiture
the inference that he did not intend a forfeiture. Therefore, Savanna must rest upon the second
explanation.
Arguably the Savanna court distorted the conveyance in an effort to effectuate the grantor's intent.
Under certain compelling circumstances such as long periods of compliance, a court may feel that
the grantor would not desire a forfeiture. Although grantors use defeasible fees to control their
devise, strict enforcement would yield a harsh result that was clearly beyond the grantor's contem-
plation. Cf infra note 105 (discussing Cy pres and administrative deviation doctrines).
60. Alamo School Dist, v. Jones, 182 Cal. App. 2d 180, 190, 6 Cal. Rptr. 272, 278 (1960) (only
"party of first part" can repurchase on breach; thus, the deed created a contingent opinion that
expired at grantor's death); Savanna School Dist. v. McLeod, 137 Cal. App. 2d 491, 496, 290 P.2d
593, 596 (1955) (reverter "to party of first part" held to expire at death of grantor). But see Haw-
thorne v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 374 So. 2d 813, 816 (Miss. 1979) (reverter to "the grantors
herein" did not make the reservation personal to the grantors).
61. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 63-76 and accompanying text. A finding that the grantees did not breach
the condition does not free the land; the condition or limitation remains, with its attendant negative
effects on alienability, marketability, and the efficient use of resources.
63. In McKissick v. Pickle, 16 Pa. 140 (1851), the grant was for schoolhouse, religious use, or
burying ground only. The court held that renting the schoolhouse to a tenant was only a temporary
diversion, not rising to the level of a breach. Id. at 148.
64. 58 Wis. 135, 15 N.W. 133 (1883).
65. Id. at 139, 15 N.W. at 133.
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because of the insubstantial nature of the breach.66
Courts may also interpret the "for school purposes" condition to per-
mit subsequent use of the property for purposes other than actual classes.
Thus, courts have held that a grantee can retain land conveyed "for
school purposes only" when the grantee uses the land for teacher of-
fices, 67 a school parking lot,68 storage of school supplies, 69 or a school
bus stop.70 In addition, temporary abandonment of classroom use does
not violate the condition.71
Similarly, courts often interpret the term "permanent ' 72 or "main-
tain"73 as only requiring the grantee to erect a permanent structure, not
66. Id. at 142-44, 15 N.W. at 135. The court stated:
[W]e do not think the plaintiffs can claim the property for condition broken, for there has
been no total abandonment of it for seminary purposes . . . . True, [the trustees] con-
veyed away the property, and did acts quite inconsistent with the due performance of their
duty. But they have retraced their steps, and are now using the property for the purpose
designated by the grantors.
Id. at 142-43, 15 N.W. at 135. Though no forfeiture resulted, this case is a striking example of how
rights of reentry can tie up the use of land. See also Board v. Nevada School Dist., 363 Mo. 328, 251
S.W.2d 20 (1952) (court found no breach, but also did not invalidate the condition).
Ignorance of a restriction may also be a valid defense to an action for forfeiture. Bonniwell v.
Madison, 107 Iowa 85, 89, 77 N.W. 530, 532 (1898) (grantor's failure to tell grantee of a condition
precluded enforcement upon breach); Rose v. Hawley, 118 N.Y. 502, 517, 23 N.E. 904, 906 (1890)
(encroachment by grantee's building into a restricted area held not a breach because it was impossi-
ble for grantees to tell if a breach had occurred).
67. Board of Educ. v. Hunter, 190 Ga. 767, 768, 10 S.E.2d 749, 750 (1940).
68. In re School Dist. of Pittsburgh, 30 Pa. 566, 571, 244 A.2d 42, 45 (1968).
69. DeHart v. Ritenour Consol. School Dist., 663 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Bal-
lantyne v. Nedrose Pub. School Dist., 177 N.W.2d 551, 553 (N.D. 1970).
70. McCullough v. Swifton Consol. School Dist., 202 Ark. 1074, 155 S.W.2d 353 (1941).
71. Board v. Nevada School Dist., 363 Mo. 328, 336-37, 251 S.W.2d 20, 25 (1952) (no classes
for one year was a temporary cessation of school use, not an abandonment); Locke v. Union Graded
School Dist., 185 Okla. 471, 472, 94 P.2d 547, 548 (1939) (noncontinuous use as a school due to
small number of children nearby did not constitute abandonment).
72. In Mead v. Ballard, 74 U.S. 290 (1869), the grantor conveyed land to an institution on the
condition that the institute "permanently" locate on the land, and expressly provided a reverter
clause. The buildings burned down ten years after their construction. The grantors brought suit to
enforce the reversion. The Supreme Court denied their claim, holding that "permanent" does not
mean the grantee must build and rebuild, but only that the construction be done with an intention of
permanence. Id. at 204. Therefore the grantees were owners in fee simple absolute. Accord Texas &
Pac. Ry. v. Marshall, 136 U.S. 393 (1890) (railroad's contractual obligation to establish "perma-
nent" terminal in city fulfilled when railroad constructs and operates terminal for eight years).
In DeHart v. Ritenour Consol. School Dist., 663 S.W.2d 332 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983), the court also
implied that if the deed of land for school purposes included language such as "permanently locate,'
[or] permanently establish,' " the grantees would have satisfied the condition when they established a
school building in permanent form. According to the court, the condition did "not require perpetual
use of the buildings for the stated purposes." Id. at 335.
73. Board of Comm'rs of Trego Co. v. Hays, 93 Kan. 829, 831-32, 145 P. 847, 848 (1915)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss1/6
DEFEASIBLE FEES
as permanently conditioning title on the continued existence of the build-
ing. In Holbrook v. Board of Education,74 the conveyance to the school
board required the board to erect and maintain a schoolhouse before the
end of five years. Forty years later, the school board closed the school.
The grantor's heirs brought an action to force the school to reconvey the
land. In finding for the school district, the court noted that the deed did
not require the school board to maintain the schoolhouse "forever" or
"always." 75  It concluded that the grantor intended the condition of
maintenance to last only five years.76
The Holbrook court's approach deliberately clouds the meaning of
words that normally and unambiguously create a perpetuity. Holbrook
illustrates the courts' general hostility toward defeasible fees, 7 7 and the
lengths to which they will go to forestall a socially unconscionable forfei-
ture. Unfortunately, however, this approach leads to uncertainty in con-
veyancing and may deny the grantor's reasonable expectations.78
Moreover, when the conveyance clearly and unavoidably creates a
condition of defeasance, the courts prefer to construe the grant to create
an estate subject to a condition subsequent, rather than a determinable
fee. 79 Accordingly, in Priddy v. School District," a school district ac-
quired a plot for "so long as [it is] used for a schoolhouse site."8 The
land was to revert if the grantees ever abandoned this use. Although the
deed's language appeared to create a determinable fee,82 the court found
only a condition subsequent; the court never considered the possibility of
(grantees' erection and use of school for eleven years satisfied condition that county erect and main-
tain a school on the land; grantors lost all rights in land); see also McArdle v. School Dist. of
Omaha, 179 Neb. 122, 130, 136 N.W.2d 422, 427 (1965) (provision requiring reversion of property if
grantees ever "refuse" or "neglect" to use land for school purposes held not applicable when use
discontinued by necessity).
74. 300 S.W.2d 566 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957).
75. Id. at 568.
76. Id.
77. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
78. Note, supra note 47, at 248.
79. Hagaman v. Board of Educ., 117 N.J. Super. 446, 453-54, 285 A.2d 63, 67 (1971) ("if a
choice is between an estate in fee simple determinable and an estate on condition subsequent, the
latter is preferred"). A condition subsequent is less objectionable because the forfeiture is not auto-
matic. R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 188 (1966); see Bordwell, supra note 24, at 444.
80. 92 Okla. 254, 219 P. 141 (1923).
81. Id. at 255, 219 P. at 142.
82. The court construed the following limiting language as creating a condition subsequent:
"As long as used for a schoolhouse site. If it is ever abandoned as a schoolhouse site, said land shall
revert to [the grantor]." Id. at 255, 219 P. at 143 (emphasis added). For a discussion of language
creating determinable fees and conditions subsequent, see supra note 11-16.
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a determinable fee.83
A condition subsequent requires the holder of the right of entry to take
affirmative action to enter and reclaim the property.84 A court that is
able to characterize a future interest as a right of entry may prevent a
forfeiture by finding that the claim was not presented in a timely fashion.
For example, the court may find a breach of the condition, but deny the
forfeiture because the plaintiffs failed to assert their right of entry within
the time provided by the statute of limitations.85 In states without a
statutory time limit on the exercise of a right of entry, a court may still
require the holder of the right to act within a "reasonable time."86
An example of judicial imposition of a limitation period occured in
Faust v. Little Rock School District.87 In Faust, the deed required the city
to use the land to erect a hospital, workhouse, or any other public build-
ing conducive to the public good.88 The city conveyed the land to the
local school district in 1870. When the school district decided to sell the
property in the 1950's, heirs of the grantors alleged that the district's
83. The grant contained the proper words of limitation and an express reverter provision. Such
language creates a determinable fee. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see also Stewart v.
Blain, 159 S.W. 928, 930-31 (Tex. 1913) (court ignored the language of the deed and adopted the
"four corners" method of deriving intent from the deed as a whole).
In Mahrenholz v. County Bd. of School Trustees, 93 Ill. App. 3d 366, 417 N.E.2d 138 (1981), an
Illinois court construed a grant, which contained the language "this land to be used for school
purposes only; otherwise to revert to grantors herein," as creating a fee simple determinable. Id. at
369, 417 N.E.2d at 140. In Illinois, neither possibilities of reverter nor rights of reentry are transfer-
able by deed or will. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 37b (1983). The holder of the possibility of reverter
conveyed all of the future interest in the land to the plaintiffs. The court denied the plaintiffs' claim
of ownership because the school district had not yet broken the condition, and because the attempted
conveyance of a reversionary interest was void. 93 Ill. App. 3d at 369, 417 N.E.2d at 141. Thus,
where possibilities of reverter are inalienable, and the breach of the limitation occurs after a convey-
ance of the grantor's future interest, finding a determinable fee may frustrate an action in ejectment.
84. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Sanford v. Sims, 192 Va. 644, 66 S.E.2d 495 (1951).
86. See Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Campbell, 241 La. 1029, 1045-46, 132 So. 2d 885, 891
(1961) (Hamlin, J., dissenting) ("our law does not favor the claims of those who have long slept on
their rights, and who. . . suddenly wake up at the welcome vision of an unexpected advantage and
invoke the aid of the courts for relief. . .") (quoting Lafitte, Dulfilhot Co. v. Godchaux, 35 La.
Ann. 1161, 1163-64 (1898)); Metro Pk. Dist. v. Rigney, 65 Wash. 2d 788, 399 P.2d 516 (1965) (a
delay of sixty years to reenter is unreasonable; the condition expired); Williams, supra note 5, at 177
n.64; Comment, supra note 20, at 262. Cf Withers v. Pulaski, 415 S.W.2d 604 (Ky. 1967) (grantees
abandon schoolhouse after one hundred years; court holds entry twenty-six days into new school
year is too soon to show a school is not kept in the house, even though grantee has transferred
children to new school).
87. 224 Ark. 761, 276 S.W.2d 59 (1955).
88. Id. at 762, 276 S.W.2d at 60.
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decision breached the condition and sought to assert their right of entry.
The court concluded instead that the 1870 conveyance from the city to
the school district breached the condition. Therefore, the court held, the
heirs' silence for over eighty years barred their right of entry.8 9
Similarly, courts rely on estoppel and waiver to deny a forfeiture. 90 A
holder of a right of entry who induces the holder of the fee to breach the
condition by assurances that he will take no action is estopped from as-
serting his right of entry.91 Furthermore, when the holder of a right of
entry tolerates continuing violation of a condition subsequent in silence,
a court may deny forfeiture on the grounds that the holder waived his
rights.92
C. Equitable Avoidance of Forfeiture
A court confronted with a clear expression of the grantor's intent to
condition a plot of land may have some latitude to apply equitable princi-
ples in deciding the effect of the breach. 93 The courts have been hesitant,
however, to invoke equity to deny the legal effect of a condition, particu-
89. Id. at 766, 276 S.W.2d at 64.
90. 1 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 204-07 (3d ed. 1939).
Neither estoppel nor waiver is available to deny the operation of a reversion. Oldfield v. Stoeco
Homes, Inc., 26 N.J. 246, 139 A.2d 291 (1958); Goldstein, supra note 19, at 272; Williams, supra
note 5, at 177; Note, supra note 47, at 247 n.6. Estoppel and waiver are unavailable in cases of
reversions because the reversion occurs automatically upon breach of the limitation. See supra notes
12 & 13. Estoppel cannot occur because the grantees need not act to assert ownership upon a
breach. For the same reason, the grantor cannot waive his interest by failing to act.
91. Goldstein, supra note 19, at 266. In addition, the courts will deny forfeiture when an act by
the holder of the right of reentry prevents the grantee from complying with the condition. Williams,
supra note 5, at 178.
92. Goldstein, supra note 19, at 265; Annot. 39 A.L.R.2d 1116 (1959). In Trustees of Common
School Dist. v. Patrick, 102 S.W. 237 (Ky. 1907), the grantor conveyed land on condition that the
school district maintain a schoolhouse thereon under threat of reversion to the grantor. The school
district removed the schoolhouse with the donor's knowledge. The donor took no action to assert
his right to possession. Seven years later, the district rebuilt the school on the property with the
grantor's knowledge. Upon suit by the district to clear title, the court held that the grantor waived
his right to compel forfeiture when he allowed the district to rebuild the school without asserting his
interest. Id. at 238.
The use of waiver and estoppel is more an application of contract than property law. Comment,
supra note 20, at 263.
93. See infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text. At least one commentator has argued that
equitable principles have no application to determinable fees. Williams, supra note 5, at 172 (auto-
matic termination of determinable fee precludes application of equitable principles). But see Gold-
stein, supra note 19, at 271-75 (any technical differences between determinable fees and fees on a
condition subsequent that might preclude the application of equitable principles to determinable fees
are a "heavy dose of nonsense").
Washington University Open Scholarship
124 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 63:109
larly if no evidence points towards waiver or estoppel.94 Courts seeking
to impose equitable considerations must overcome centuries of prece-
dent9" and the judiciary's traditional reluctance to substitute its own
judgment for the grantor's intent.96
A few courts, however, have reconsidered defeasible fees in light of
equitable factors. These courts have reasoned that a change in conditions
may make specific enforcement of the condition inequitable, or even void
the entire limitation. The California Court of Appeals was the first court
to find that changed conditions nullified the limitations of the grantee's
estate. In Letteau v. Ellis,97 the grantor placed a condition in the deed
forbidding blacks from owning or occupying the property. The court
refused to grant a forfeiture despite a clear breach of the condition. In-
stead, the court held the condition invalid and unenforceable because
"public policy" 98 demanded that individual property rights yield to the
common good. The Letteau court expressly employed the public policy
doctrine to accomplish what other courts had done indirectly through
constructional devices.99 This case established principles that courts
could apply in cases involving grants to schools. 1" Courts, however,
94. Bostick, supra note 29, at 1090. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (discussing
estoppel and waiver). Two possible explanations for this judicial hesitance are that the widely vary-
ing statutes hinder development ofjudicial doctrine, and that courts doubt the propriety of substitut-
ing their judgment for the original conveyors'. Bostick, supra note 29, at 1090.
95. Comment, supra note 20, at 248.
96. Bostick, supra note 29, at 1090; Walsh, supra note 22, at 193.
97. 122 Cal. App. 584, 10 P.2d 496 (1932).
98. The court stated:
We find it needless to follow appellant's arguments on the technical rules and distinctions
made between conditions, covenants, and mere restrictions .... A principle of broad
public policy has intervened to the extent that modern progress is deemed to necessitate a
sacrifice of many former claimed individual rights. The only obstacle met has been...
the disinclination to disturb vested property rights. To some extent this, too, has yielded in
the sense that many rights formerly labeled as property rights by a process of academic
relation are now considered merely personal and have been subjected to the common good.
Id. at 588-89, 10 P.2d at 497.
99. "A frank approach is substituted for the sophistry entailed in calling a condition a cove-
nant, a trust or an easement." Goldstein, supra note 19, at 271.
Interestingly, the most innovative efforts to protect the grantee from forfeitures have come from
California, whose growing population has put the greatest pressure on its land resources and has
created the greatest need for flexibility in land use. W. LEACH & J. LOGAN, supra note 12, at 69
n.31.
100. In Letteau, the court held that evolving social conscience and public policy intervened to
negate a clear expression of the grantor's intent. 122 Cal. App. at 588-89, 10 P.2d at 497. Similarly,
public policy argues against inequitable forfeitures in school situations. This is particularly true if
the grantee has complied with the condition for a long time, has erected valuable improvements on
the land, and is compelled by declining enrollments to close the school. See DeHart v. Ritenour
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seem loath to apply this approach.
The courts have adopted the equitable doctrine of changed conditions
to deny the forfeiture of school property in only one instance. 10 1 In Mc-
Ardle v. School District of Omaha,'0 2 the grantor conveyed land to the
school district on condition that the district erect a schoolhouse on the
land. The deed expressly provided for reversion if the district ceased the
prescribed use of the land.0 3 The district built a school, which it used
continuously for ninety-seven years until a new highway cut off student
access to the site and forced the district to close the school. The gran-
tor's heirs sued for reversion. The court denied the plaintiffs' claim on
legal and equitable grounds. First, the court determined that the district
had not breached the condition because the words of the reversionary
clause-should the school board ever "refuse" or "neglect" to operate a
school on the site-contemplated a cessation by design, not by neces-
sity." 4 Then, rather than leave the community with an empty school
under a constant threat of forfeiture, the court also invalidated the whole
reversionary clause on equitable grounds. The court held that the dis-
trict's extended compliance and the changed conditions rendered en-
forcement of the provision inequitable.'
Consol. School Dist., 663 S.W.2d 332 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); supra notes 2 & 3 (discussing DeHart).
The harshness of this increases when the forfeiture merely creates nearly worthless fractional shares
in descendants far removed from the grantor. See Brown v. Independent Baptist Church of Woburn,
325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950), supra note 21 (discussing Brown). Just as fairness and public
policy overcame the court's inclination to respect the grantor's intent in Letteau, so should they
mandate a denial of forefeiture of school property that threatens the public interest.
101. In several cases, mostly in California, sufficiently changed conditions have worked to nullify
reversionary interests and prevent forfeiture. Most of these cases, however, concerned conditions
prohibiting the sale or consumption of alcoholic beverages. The courts in most cases combined the
doctrine of changed circumstances with a finding of waiver due to inconsistent enforcement of the
condition. See Townsend v. Allen, 114 Cal. App. 2d 291, 250 P.2d 292 (1952); Alexander v. Title
Ins. & Trust Co., 48 Cal. App. 2d 488, 119 P.2d 992 (1941); Wedum-Aldahl Co. v. Miller, 18 Cal.
App. 2d 745, 64 P.2d 762 (1937); Bernstein v. Minney, 96 Cal. App. 597, 274 P. 614 (1929); Cole v.
Colorado Springs Co., 152 Colo. 196, 381 P.2d 13 (1963).
Other courts have noted, in dicta, the availability of the doctrine of changed conditions to prevent
enforcement of a right of reentry. MacDonald Properties v. Bel-Air Country Club, 72 Cal. App. 3d
693, 140 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1977) (changed conditions made enforcement of building restriction condi-
tion inequitable); Arrowhead Mut. Service Co. v. Faust, 260 Cal. App. 2d 567, 67 Cal. Rptr. 325
(1968) (condition subsequent limiting land use to single family residences enforceable as surrounding
changes in the community were minimal).
102. 179 Neb. 122, 136 N.W.2d 422 (1965).
103. Id. at 124, 136 N.W.2d at 424.
104, Id.
105. Id. at 128, 136 N.W.2d at 428.
The trust doctrine of cy pres provides a useful analogy to the doctrine of changed circumstances.
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Few other courts have used equitable considerations to deny a forfei-
ture.10 6 Perhaps because the courts have been unable or unwilling °7 to
control rights of entry and possibilities of reverter, state legislatures have
begun to limit the use and effect of defeasible fees.
D. Legislative Response
A statutory scheme can create some predictability in the enforcement
of defeasible fees while mitigating the undesirable effects of possibilities
of reverter and rights of entry."° At least fifteen states have statutes
specifically regulating defeasible fees. 109 Generally, these statutes apply
four separate strategies, usually in some combination. Under the first
approach, the statutes declare that conditions which provide no benefit to
When compliance with the ptirpose of a charitable trust becomes impossible, inpracticable, or illegal
due to a change of circumstances occuring after the trust is established, courts may redirect the
trust's proceeds to another charitable beneficiary in order to effectuate the trust's general charitable
purpose. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959). See Board of Educ. v. Rockford, 372
Ill. 442, 451, 24 N.E.2d 366, 371 (1939); Estate of Rood, 41 Mich. App. 405, 415-17, 200 N.W.2d
728, 734-35 (1972).
Courts have used cypres and the relaxed doctrine of "administrative deviation" to continue chad-
table trusts in favor of educational institutions despite their direct violation of trust restrictions, Id.
at 449-54, 24 N.E.2d at 370-72 (court allowed city to sell property deeded in trust when, after eighty
years of compliance with trust restrictions, shifting population and obsolescence made continued
operation of a school on the property impracticable); see also Dartmouth College v. City of Quincy,
357 Mass. 521, 529-34, 258 N.E.2d 745, 751-53 (1970) (cy pres not applicable because charitable
purpose not literally impossible, but "administrative deviation" doctrine permits trustees to avoid
trust restrictions); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 381 (1959) (administrative deviation doc-
trine permits a trustee to violate trust's terms when unforeseen circumstances substantially impair
the purpose of the trust but do not render performance impossible).
106. In Cherokee Valley Farms, Inc. v. Summerville Elementary School Dist., 30 Cal. App. 3d
579, 106 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1973), the court invoked equitable considerations to convert a school dis-
trict's defeasible fee to a fee simple absolute. The court noted that the district had operated the
school for 78 years, and had invested substantial public funds in the building. The court concluded
that it would be unreasonable to assume the school district owned anything less than a fee simple
absolute. Id. at 586, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
107. Judicial attempts to provide an ultimate solution to the problems created by defeasible fees
have been unprincipled and inconsistent. R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 188 (1968);
Chaffin, supra note 20, at 304-05. See supra notes 43-106.
108. Simes, supra note 5, at 4.
109. CALIF. CIV. CODE §§ 885.020-.070 (West 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-97 to 98 (1981);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.18 (West 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 37e, 37f (Smith-Hurd 1983);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 614.24-.25 (West Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 381.218-.223 (Bald-
win 1983); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 103-06 (West 1983); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.
§§ 6-101-105 (1983); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 3 and ch. 260, § 31A (West 1983); MICH.
STAT. ANN. §§ 26.46, .49(11)-.49(15) (Callaghan 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.20 (West Supp.
1984); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 76-2,100-2,105 (1978); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5301.49-.51 (Page
1980); OR. REy. STAT. §§ 105.770-.774 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-4-19-24 (Supp. 1983).
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the grantor are unenforceable."1 ' The second type of provision imposes
specific time limits within which the defeasance must occur, and extin-
guishes the future interest thereafter."' 1 The third also limits the dura-
tion of reversionary interests, but permits the holder of the interest to
preserve it by periodic rerecording." 2 The fourth combines the Rule
Against Perpetuities and an absolute time limit by converting to an abso-
lute fee any defeasible fee whose contingency: (1) can occur beyond the
period of the Rule, and (2) does not actually occur within the time
limit." 13
These statutes seek to eliminate stale restrictions on land while permit-
ting the grantor some latitude to control the ultimate use of his property.
Several state statutes, however, exclude public schools from the benefit of
these improvements. California," 4  Connecticut,1 5 Florida,1 16 Ken-
tucky, 17 Michigan,11 Oregon,119 and Rhode Island 120 exempt convey-
110, CALIF. CIV. CODE § 885.040 (restriction expires if it confers no substantial benefit on the
holder, or if enforcement would not serve the purpose of the restriction, or due to changed condi-
tions); MICH. STAT.ANN. § 26.46 (Callaghan 1974) (conditions which do not provide substantial
benefit to the holder of the right to enforce the condition are unenforceable); MINN. STAT.ANN.
§ 500.20 (West Supp. 1984) (conditions which provide no or nominal benefit to the grantor are not a
basis for forfeiture).
111. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30, § 37e (1983) (forty-year limit applied prospectively); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 76-2,102-2,105 (1978) (thirty-year period of validity applied both prospectively and
retroactively).
112. See, eg., CALIF. CIV. CODE § 885.030 (West 1982) (rerecording required every thirty years
to preserve interest); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 345 (McKinney 1968) (future interest expires auto-
matically after thirty years unless holder rerecords interest between twenty-seven and thirty years
after creation and thereafter between nine and ten years after previous rerecording).
113. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-97-98 (1981); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 26.49(12) & .49(14)
(Callaghan 1984). Michigan's statute, however, allows extension of the time limit by periodic rere-
cording. Id. § 26.49(15).
114. CALIF. CIV. CODE § 885.040 (West 1982) (exempts grants made for no consideration).
115. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-9 (1981) (exempts conveyances for public purposes).
116. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.18(5) (West 1969) (exempts any conveyances made, inter alia, to
any educational corporation or association).
117. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 381.219-.222 (Baldwin 1983) (provisions of the act do not apply
to fees for public, charitable, or religious purposes).
118. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1191 (Callaghan 1982) (grants for educational purposes are not
invalid for indefiniteness or for contravening the Rule Against Perpetuities).
Michigan, however, allows the holder of the fee to petition to have the court remove the condition
of the grant whenever the use of the property for school purposes becomes impossible or impractical
to fulfill by reason of changed conditions. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1211-.1213 (Callaghan 1982).
119. OR. REV. STAT. § 105.774 (1983) (exempts grants made in favor of educational corpora-
tions or associations).
120. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-4-20 (Supp. 1984) (exempts grants, gifts or devises for public
purposes).
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ances made for charitable purposes, including those made to schools,
from their restrictions on conditional fees. Legislators employ this ex-
emption to encourage grants to charitable causes. 121 Restrictive cove-
nants and charitable trusts, however, offer a grantor alternative methods
of achieving this purpose;' 22 therefore it is unlikely that limiting the op-
eration of defeasible fees would deter charitable giving. These exemp-
tions arose in the nineteenth century, when the effect of conditional fees
on the general welfare was either unknown or ignored. 123  Modern cir-
cumstances 24  suggest that legislatures should eliminate these
exemptions.
Commentators have proposed other statutory solutions. 25 One com-
mentator has suggested applying the Rule Against Perpetuities to pos-
sibilities of reverter and rights of entry.126 The Rule, however, does not
provide a perfect solution. It would allow the grantor to tie the term of
the condition to a life in being plus twenty-one years. Thus, the limita-
tion may last one hundred years or more, which may be much longer
than the condition's usefulness. 127  Additional problems appear in at-
tempting to apply the Rule retroactively. Before the statute was enacted
a grantor would not know to tie the condition to a life in being. If there
is no life in being at the creation of the interest, the interest has a maxi-
mum life of twenty-one years, which is a rather short upper limit.128 Fi-
121. Cook, supra note 30, at 521.
122. See Bostick, supra note 29, at 1099.
123. Cook, supra note 30, at 522.
124. Gray argued that courts should place similar restrictions on defeasible fees and charitable
trusts:
As an original question it would seem to have been well if determinable charitable trusts
had been inhibited as well as determinable fees, and as when a man gives property to A in
fee, he must give it to him forever, so when he gives it in charity he ought to be obliged to
give it forever. But the law seems settled otherwise.
J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 603i (3d ed. 1915). See supra notes 1-4 and accom-
panying text.
125. See L. SIMES & C. TAYLOR, IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING BY LEGISLATION 201-17
(1960). The authors discuss several existing and proposed statutory schemes. Their Model Act, id.
at 214-16, incorporates a thirty year limit on possibilities of reverter and rights of reentry coupled
with a recording provision to preserve these interests when they otherwise would become invalid.
Cf. Williams, supra note 5, at 181 (urging a more "efficient" judicial solution).
126. Walsh, supra note 22, at 194-96.
127. Chaffin, supra note 20, at 321.
128. L. SIMES & C. TAYLOR, supra note 125, at 204.
Thirty years is the usual outside limit on possibilities of reverter and rights of reentry. Legislators
select it because it theoretically equals the period of one generation. Then the number of the gran-
tor's or devisor's heirs will not be so great that obtaining releases becomes highly impractical. Note,
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nally, the uncertainty surrounding the period of the Rule would often
require litigation to establish title.
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Solving the problem faced by school districts that hold land subject to
conditions does not require abolition of the fee simple determinable or
the fee upon a condition subsequent. The conditions and limitations im-
posed by these defeasible fees may serve useful purposes. 129 If a commu-
nity has constructed a school at great expense and has used it for many
years, however, mandatory forfeiture is inequitable. The courts are not
impotent to remedy such a situation,13 ° but the availability of judicial
relief is too uncertain."3 Even if the judiciary were to adopt the equita-
ble principles employed by the Letteau132 and McArdle'33 courts, relief
would be available only upon a showing of sufficiently changed circum-
stances. 134 This approach in turn raises the question whether declining
enrollments and lower budgets constitute changed circumstances.
The answer to the disorganization at the court level obviously lies in
legislative action. Courts have generally upheld the constitutionality of
retroactive legislation. 35 Thus, legislatures can act to remedy the effects
A Proposed Statutory Limitation on the Duration of (1) Possibilities of Reverter, (2) Conditions Subse-
quent, and (3) Equitable Restrictions, 15 Wis. L. REv. 121, 124 (1940).
129. "It cannot be asserted that conditions subsequent and determinable are mala per se. In
many cases, and perhaps in most cases, they may serve proper social and economic ends." Williams,
supra note 5, at 180. For a discussion of the salutory uses of defeasible fees, see Brake, supra note 5.
For some examples of purely whimsical and capricious conditions, see Scott, Control of Property by
the Dead, 65 U. PA. L. REv. 527, 535-37 (1917).
130. See supra notes 42-107 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 58-59 & 78 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
134. See MacDonald Properties v. Bel-Air Country Club, 72 Cal. App. 3d 693, 140 Cal. Rptr.
367 (1977) (insufficient showing of changed conditions to make inequitable enforcement of building
restriction condition); Arrowhead Mut. Service Co. v. Faust, 260 Cal. App. 2d 567, 67 Cal. Rptr.
325 (1968) (condition subsequent limiting land use to single family residences enforceable as sur-
rounding changes in the community were minimal).
135. Blackert v. Dugosh, 12 Ill. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 606 (1957) (reverter statute held constitu-
tional as applied to a possibility of reverter in land originally conveyed for school purposes); Cline v.
Johnson Co. Bd. of Educ., 548 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1977) (upholding the constitutionality of Ken-
tucky's retroactive reverter act); Hiddleston v. Nebraska Jewish Educ. Soc'y, 186 Neb. 786, 186
N.W.2d 904 (1971) (upheld the retroactive provision of the state's reverter statute against claims
that it violated the due process and contract clauses). But see Biltmore Village, Inc. v. Royal, 71 So.
2d 727 (Fla. 1954) (retroactive portion of Florida's reverter statute declared unconstitutional as
impairing the obligations of a contract).
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of preexisting defeasible fees. Legislation restricting defeasible fees must
extinguish conditions or limitations after a stated term of years. 136 This
approach would solve the basic problem of uncertainty while still giving
some consideration to the desires of the grantor. 137 Statutory recording
acts138 are inadequate, because rerecording can extend an interest into
perpetuity.139 Finally, the statute should not exempt conveyances to
schools, because the community requires the same relief from the effects
of conditions of defeasance as a private party.
A statutory limit on the duration of reversions and entry rights, if cou-
pled with a judicial application of equitable "change of conditions" prin-
ciples, 4° would encourage the use of other less onerous devices for
conditioning grants for schools.141 This solution would properly balance
the individual's desire to condition a donation and the need to protect
important public resources.
Todd T. Erickson
136. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text. Not only does a specific time limit elimi-
nate much of the litigation otherwise necessary to clear a title, but it also eases the responsibilities of
the conveyancer by limiting his title search for reversionary interests to a clearly established maxi-
mum number of years. Report of the Committee on Improvement of Conveyancing and Recording
Practices, A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. LAW 75 (1957).
137. Id. at 78.
138. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
139. See Report, supra note 136, at 80.
140. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
141. See Bostick, supra note 29, at 1099; supra note 122 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 63:109
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss1/6
